9th July 2025 Feature Indian and Pakistan air forces clash Mina Adel delves into the previous experiences of both the Pakistan and Indian air forces that may have aided them during their spat in May The Chengdu J-10C was undoubtedly a mystery to the Indian Air Force until the night of May 6/7. They certainly know the PAF’s capabilities now Awais Lali Air battles between the Indian and Pakistani air forces have always been described as among the fiercest in history, not only in terms of intensity and the number of aircraft involved but also due to the daring and bravery of pilots on both sides. Due to these clashes, the names of pilots such as Muhammad Mahmood (MM) Alam and Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon became legendary. On May 7, many of us took a keen interest in one of the most significant and intense air battles in modern history. What made this confrontation particularly noteworthy was that it involved two evenly matched adversaries, each equipped with a mix of Western and Eastern military systems. As usual, the battle sparked widespread debate in the media, leading to the circulation of misinformation that initially obscured the facts. This prompted Air Forces Monthly, renowned for its commitment to providing unique and impartial coverage for its readers, to engage with an elite group of experts and former pilots to analyse the battle and extract valuable lessons for future aerial conflicts. Among them were Osman Basibuyuk, a Turkish F-16C instructor and air combat specialist; Pierre-Henri Chuet, a French Navy Rafale pilot; and Mikael Grev, a Swedish Gripen pilot. Sweeping Indian storm On May 6, India issued a notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding a large-scale aerial manoeuvre along the southern part of its border with Pakistan, scheduled to take place between May 7 and May 8, 2025. On the same day, Indian P-8I aircraft were flying over the Arabian Sea. These aircraft possess advanced intelligence-gathering and communication capabilities, allowing them to monitor hostile communications and identify potential threats, particularly air defence systems. In addition to their primary role in maritime surveillance, they also play a crucial role in monitoring Pakistani naval exercises in the region. At dawn on May 7, the Indian military launched a counterterrorism operation named Operation Sindoor. The term Sindoor is a red cosmetic powder worn by married women. It is a symbol of marital status, and its absence often signifies widowhood, thus symbolising the loss of husbands in the recent terrorist attack. According to India’s official statement, fighter jets took off from multiple air bases to conduct precision strikes on nine sites along the Pakistani border believed to be linked to terrorist groups, without targeting any Pakistani military installations. The Indian military released footage confirming the successful precision strikes on targets using cruise missiles such as SCALP, AASM guided munitions, Harop kamikaze drones, and even quadcopters. However, local sources reported that the attacks resulted in 26 civilian deaths and 46 injuries, and that Pakistan’s air defences failed to deter or stop the assault. Then the Indian Air Force expanded its aerial campaign, making Pakistani air bases primary targets. Eleven PAF air bases attacked, with footage confirming strikes on facilities such as Rafiqui, Nur Khan (formerly Chaklala), Rahim Yar, Sukkur (Bholari), Chunian, Mushaf (Sargodha) and Shahbaz (Jacobabad), along with three key air defence radar sites in Basrur, Sukkur and Arif Wala. These specific airbases were selected due to their strategic importance, as they house Pakistan Air Force command and control centres, and their tactical significance, which includes hosting elite squadrons with strike-capable fighter jets. However, despite the strikes, India’s missile attacks lacked the necessary intensity to cripple aerial operations, causing only minor damage to runways and hangars, which were easily repairable during air operations. The primary objective appeared to be the delivery of a strategic political message rather than inflicting catastrophic damage. Chuet examined the photos of the strikes and shared some interesting observations: “The Indians have demonstrated their ability to carry out precise strikes and inflict damage. In the military, we generally favour the concentration of forces, meaning that firepower is typically focused on a specific target. However, in this case, the Indians, likely for political messaging and marketing reasons, opted for a more dispersed approach, striking multiple locations but with relatively limited impact at each site. “There are two possible explanations: either this was a deliberate decision to avoid escalation, which aligns with their official narrative, or many of their missiles were intercepted. Nevertheless, when we analyse the precision of the strikes and the absence of widespread collateral damage, unlike situations in Ukraine, where strikes often leave noticeable marks on surrounding areas, it becomes evident that the Indians possess the capability to conduct pre-planned, highly accurate attacks in Pakistan. This challenges Pakistani claims regarding their ability to degrade the precision of Indian missiles, especially given the fact that Indian forces successfully struck key structures in a manner consistent with Western military operations. He concluded: “Once again, we should be cautious when hearing assertions that the Indians are incompetent or lack precision. These strikes demonstrate that they can target Pakistani military bases with remarkable accuracy. As a former ground attack pilot, I recognise a well-executed mission when I see one. In this case, the Indians effectively carried out their air-toground targeting operations.” PAF professionalism in air combat The Pakistani military announced the launch of Operation Bunyan al-Marsous to counter the Indian forces, which they claimed had struck fictitious terrorist targets, as described by the Pakistani Prime Minister. Pakistan later officially declared that it had shot down five Indian fighter jets in a fierce aerial battle, including three Rafale jets, a Su-30, and a MiG-29, with no official response from the Indian side. In a press conference, the spokesperson for the Pakistan Air Force provided a detailed explanation of the aerial battle between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, describing it as one of the most intense air battles in modern history. A total of 72 Indian fighter jets engaged with 42 Pakistani fighter jets. The Indian formations concentrated their forces for an attack from four principal axes, prompting the Pakistani side to call in additional fighter jets to reinforce the formations already engaged in the aerial battle. The Pakistani strategy focused on identifying the types of Indian aircraft using their signals, confirming the presence of 14 French-made Rafale jets. Immediately, orders were issued for pilots to prioritise the destruction of the Rafale jets to weaken the Indian formations. The Pakistani formations took two minutes to adjust the rules of engagement and 20 minutes to deploy 42 aircraft into the air. It is estimated that the number of fighter jets has reached 40, comprising three models: the F-16 MLU, JF-17C Block-3 and the J-10CE. These were divided into ten Finger 4 formations, a standard tactic for Pakistani fighter jets based on American combat doctrine. The PAF claims of downing three Indian Air Force Rafales, has not done the French jet any good. Undoubtedly both Thales who supplied the SPECTRA electronic warfare system and Dassault the aircraft manufacturers will be carrying out their own investigations as to why it happened Sanjay Simha “The PL-15 missile’s radar is probably activated 15-30 seconds before impact.” The Pakistanis had multiple opportunities to study and engage the Rafale aircraft in various training exercises. Their experience began with training alongside naval Rafale jets on the French aircraft carrier in 2012, followed by exercises with Qatari Rafale jets during Anatolian Eagle 2021 in Turkey. Additionally, they participated in Spears of Victory drills in 2024 and 2025, where they trained with both French and Qatari Rafale jets. Finally, the Pakistanis engaged in combat exercises against Qatari Typhoon jets during Zelzal–2024. While these experiences do not diminish the capabilities of the French Rafale, its opponent has thoroughly developed effective counter-tactics, which have given it an advantage, as the Pakistani Air Force spokesperson emphasised in a statement. On the other hand, the Indian Air Force also participates annually in exercises against similar or more advanced aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force. Notably, in Pitch-Black exercises in Australia, Cope India against the US Air Force, Garuda with the French Air Force, Cobra Warrior with the Royal Air Force, and even Red Flag drills in the United States. However, it has never participated in any exercises against Chinese jets, particularly the J-10C. Basibuyuk stated: “As someone who has previously participated in exercises with Pakistani pilots and flown with exchange pilots sent to Turkey, I can easily say the training level of Pakistani pilots is high.” He added: “The Pakistan Air Force has been participating in the Anatolian Eagle exercises held in Turkey for many years [since 2004]. These exercises have the same characteristics as the Red Flag exercises conducted in the US. The Pakistan Air Force regularly send their F-16C/ Ds and JF-17 Thunders to Exercise Anatolian Eagle at Konya, where the aircrews would undoubtedly pick up valuable tactical tips Alan Warnes An Indian Air Force Su-30MKI from Bareilly Air Force Station comes into land at Tanagra air base in Greece after an Exercise Iniochos sortie in April. Turkey works with Pakistan, Greece entertains India; all four air forces align with their enemy’s enemy Alan Warnes “If the operating frequencies of the threat are not in the library, it is not possible to prevent or deceive such threats.” “In the Anatolian Eagle training area, air warfare can be exercised in conditions closest to reality. Such exercises, which simulate real warfare, provide pilots with great experience. We know that the Pakistan Air Force has also participated in Red Flag exercises in the US. Therefore, the pilots had practiced air combat similar to the one that took place on May 7 many times in their training, so they did not encounter any surprises. This was their biggest advantage. As for Indian pilots, they don’t have so much experience in international exercises and training.” Basibuyuk added: “One of the most critical factors that determines the winner of a war is the technology of the weapons used. Previously, the main striking force of the Pakistan Air Force was the F-16. Pakistan added new F-16 Block 52+ aircraft to its fleet in 2005. However, they are not used in intercept missions. The radars of the F-16s in the PAF are old technology now (AN/APG-68 radar). The emergence of AESA has revolutionised fire control radars.” After Pakistan received J-10Cs with AESA radars from China, it must have tested them against their F-16s. The J-10Cs would have gained superiority over western-made F-16s and their weapons, so that the PAF began using J-10Cs as interceptor aircraft. This preference indicates the J-10C aircraft possesses significant capabilities. Indian mistakes or forced to act? The Indians did not initially target PAF aircraft, defence systems, or radars at the start of the battle, as they believed this might lead to a direct aerial engagement. However, this assumption was wrong, considering the Balakot 2019 conflict, when the PAF responded to Indian attacks not aimed at the Pakistan military. So I asked experts for their assessment of both sides and to clarify the tactics used in such combat scenarios: Chuet explained: “We have a border, and on the other side of it Pakistani fighters were present. On the Indian side, they probably sent fighters known as ‘sweeps’. The role of sweeps is not to engage in direct combat but rather to ensure that enemy fighters retreat, preventing them from penetrating or interfering with the firing points of the strikers. One key aspect to analyse in the coming weeks is which aircraft were assigned to air-to-air roles, and which were tasked with air-to-ground operations. Did the Indian forces separate these roles, or did they assume that the Rafale, being their best aircraft, would initially perform air-to-ground operations before switching to an air-to-air role? If this transition occurred, it would have burdened the Rafale, making it vulnerable against specialised enemy aircraft designed for air-to-air combat. He added: “Another surprising aspect is the altitude at which the strikers operated. Typically, we would expect them to arrive at low altitudes, then go up to fire their SCALP missiles or BrahMos missiles before ascending. After firing, they would then descend to avoid enemy counterattacks. Understanding whether the aircraft that were hit were strikers or sweepers is crucial because it offers insight into India’s combat strategy. If strikers were hit, it would suggest a serious tactical planning error, specifically concerning the ‘low high low’ decisions on approaching firing points. The two-man Su-30MKI Flanker is undoubtedly a formidable enemy, and has many operational strengths like the huge BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Still, the Pakistan Air Force claims to have shot one down in May and back in 2019 during the Balakot operation Alan Warnes Many believe that Qatar worked with Pakistan to help unlock the tactical strengths of the Dassault Rafale may have while exercising together Kevin Wills “However, currently, there is no definitive proof that strikers were affected. If, on the other hand, sweepers or aircraft assigned to swing roles were hit, it becomes vital to analyse the timing of their downing because their briefing likely focused on launching the attack, returning safely, and concluding operations. “However, Pakistani forces responded with massive force – reportedly deploying over 42 fighters into the air. At that point, an in-flight decision might have been made to change the mission objective. Combat pilots are aware that altering mission plans mid-flight is risky. If the initial plan was to strike and retreat, but then the general staff suddenly instructed pilots to defend the border against PAF aircraft, this represented a significant shift in strategy. The air combat that ensued was no longer just about protecting strike aircraft but turned into a battle for securing Indian airspace.” Pakistani effective tactics What was different from the 2019 battle, was that Pakistan’s response came swiftly within the same fight, without a prolonged delay. This could indicate the Pakistani side was well-prepared, both in terms of intelligence and training, allowing them to execute their mission directly and engage without hesitation. We can assume that the primary focus of the Indian aircraft was on monitoring the F-16s. However, considering the scattered locations where aircraft were shot down according to the PAF claims, it becomes evident that the PAF successfully manoeuvred the J-10s and integrated them into mixed formations. Basibuyuk explained: “If we put aside the manoeuvrability of the aircraft, we can say that an interceptor aircraft must have three basic advantages to gain an advantage over an enemy aircraft. One: it must see the enemy first; two: it must be able to fire at the enemy first, and thirdly it must have an increased ability to protect itself with an electronic warfare system. Pakistan effectively utilised its data link (Link-17) capability during this conflict, which is crucial for transferring the air picture to interceptors. “Here’s a simple explanation of how air engagement takes place. AWACS (in this case the Erieye system) detects the Rafale aircraft and sends target information to the J-10C via data link. J-10C fires the PL-15 missile according to the information received from AWACS. Still, it does not lock on the target with its radar. Thus, the Rafale aircraft is not aware an enemy aircraft has locked onto it. Data link is maintained between the missile in the air and the firing aircraft, so the current target position is constantly updated to the rocket. The missile continues to approach the target. At this time, the missile’s radar is still inactive. JF-17C Thunder Block 3s with their Chinese KLJ-7A AESA radar, vast array of missiles including the Chinese PL-15, bombs, and Aselpod target pod with an air-to-air refuelling system, make the jet a very different beast from the Block 1/2s. The JF-17Cs have been exhibited at Dubai 2023, Saudi 2024 and Bahrain 2024 airshows in recent years Alan Warnes “Since the J-10C aircraft does not have a radar lock on the Rafale, and the rocket coming does not have a lock on the target, the Rafale is still unaware of the enemy engaging it.” Basibuyuk added: “The PL-15 missile is an active radar-guided missile. The missile’s radar is probably activated 15 to 30 seconds before impact. Since reaction time is very short, the distance is very close, and the PL-15’s radar is AESA-based, jamming will not be effective at that position. In this case, Rafale can’t survive. “The attack on the Rafale with this tactic was a complete surprise and achieved a very significant success. Additionally, the self-protection system on the Rafale, known as Spectra, did not function effectively. This could be due to two reasons. Either the system’s capability is not good, or the threat library does not contain information about the J-10C aircraft and the PL-15 missile. If the operating frequencies of the threat are not in the library, it is not possible to prevent or deceive such threats.” Important lessons This battle highlighted the importance of electronic support aircraft, particularly early warning aircraft and specialist electronic warfare aircraft, as well as the tactical advantages they can provide to fighter formations. Grev explained: “In BVR [Beyond Visual Range] combat, much of the battle revolves around situational awareness [SA]. A robust sensor, like the one on the Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C, is a vital asset in BVR combat. It can fly at a safe distance, detect all enemies with its powerful radar, and send this information to fighter aircraft on combat air patrol (CAP) at the front, thus eliminating the need for them to use their radar for SA. He added: “An AEW&C enhances the ‘observe’ phase in the crucial OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). What further strengthens the ‘Orient’ phase is the availability of decision support. “By consolidating information in one place, advanced AI systems can process sensor data and present it to the operator in a way that maximises their understanding of the actual threat. Another lesson learned from this battle is the benefits of long-range missiles, such as the PL-15, and the features that make them a significant threat to NATO aircraft in the future. This is due to the ability of Chinese aircraft to carry a large number of these missiles at a lower manufacturing cost. Basibuyuk stated: “After this conflict, the Chinese released videos of the factory where the PL-15E missiles were produced. The missiles were produced by robotics technology without human intervention. With these images, China gave the world the message that it could produce a large number of missiles in a very short time. Air-toair missiles are costly weapons, and China’s mass production will ensure that the price of these weapons is significantly lower.” He concluded: “In the past, Western companies and Russian companies were in competition in the market, but I think the Chinese will replace the Russians in the coming years.” Chuet said: “I was an officer in the tactical unit when I was on Super Étendard, and in 2013, I took the initiative to write a summary on air-to-air missiles. I enjoyed researching all the available information from open sources about the air-to-air missiles in existence. That is how I discovered the PL missile family. It has only been a few years since Western armies finally acknowledged their capabilities. Today, most nations around the world use these well-known Fox 3 missiles, which operate on a fire-andforget principle, and they train almost daily to counter this type of threat.” He added: “It seems the Chinese have automated their missile manufacturing, which would allow them, in the event of combat, to supply their numerous aircraft with missiles rapidly. This process can be highly efficient – if a fighter jet is equipped with six or eight airto-air missiles, compared to the two Meteor missiles on the Rafale, the ability to replenish them quickly becomes crucial. “However, for this strategy to be effective, the defence industry must be capable of sustaining high production rates. He concluded: “I am eager to see whether Pakistan will announce orders for stealth aircraft in the coming months or years. Additionally, it will be interesting to observe whether China secures international orders for the J-10C compared to the successful Rafale. |
Indian and Pakistan air forces clash Mina Adel delves into the previous experiences of both the Pakistan and Indian air forces that may have aided them during their spat in May Air battles between the Indian and Pakistani air forces have always been described as among the fiercest in history, not only in terms of intensity and the number of aircraft involved but also due to the daring and bravery of pilots on both sides. Due to these clashes, the names of pilots such as Muhammad Mahmood (MM) Alam and Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon became legendary. On May 7, many of us took a keen interest in one of the most significant and intense air battles in modern history. What made this confrontation particularly noteworthy was that it involved two evenly matched adversaries, each equipped with a mix of Western and Eastern military systems. As usual, the battle sparked widespread debate in the media, leading to the circulation of misinformation that initially obscured the facts. This prompted Air Forces Monthly, renowned for its commitment to providing unique and impartial coverage for its readers, to engage with an elite group of experts and |