英国航空月刊报道：小巴击落印度四架阵风，重创四架

charleswu

解读 猎杀″阵风″（上）

https://www.key.aero/article/when-going-gets-tough

空军月刊艾伦·沃恩斯深入巴空军了解5.7空战全貌

“我们伏击了他们，”一位巴基斯坦空军（PAF）高级官员在7月中旬告诉我。“我们将他们困入我们的杀伤链，并制造了混乱。”

这正是巴基斯坦空军声称其在5月7日凌晨击落六架印度空军（IAF）战斗机的方式。当时，在巴基斯坦与印度的边境地区，爆发了史上规模最大的超视距（BVR）空战。

印度空军发起了“红粉”行动（“Sindoor”指印度教妇女佩戴的一种橙/红色粉末）。巴基斯坦空军则以“坚固结构”行动（“Bunyan-un-Marsoos”，源自《古兰经》的阿拉伯语短语，意为坚实的结构）予以反击。

超过114架战斗机参与了此次空战——印度空军72架，巴基斯坦空军42架——据信大部分战机都装备了由法国、以色列、俄罗斯和中国研发的超视距导弹。这位高级官员说：“空战开始52分钟后，战斗结束，我们赢了，他们撤回了基地。”

“我们本可以击落更多的‘阵风’，但我们克制了。冲突升级可能导致两个核国家之间的全面战争。在‘坚固结构’行动中，我们瞄准了‘阵风’和S-400（俄罗斯防空系统），效果非常好！”

空战的展开

4月22日，在印控克什米尔地区发生了帕哈尔加姆恐怖袭击，五名武装**杀害了26名平民，其中大部分是印度教徒。印度一直寻求对此进行报复。由总理纳伦德拉·莫迪领导的印度政府将此次暴行归咎于巴基斯坦，他本人以及大多数印度公众似乎都渴望复仇。

“我们保持高度戒备，等待对方的反应，”那位巴基斯坦空军官员告诉我。

在紧张的六天里，巴基斯坦空军监控到印度运输机队的集结，这些运输机为部署到印度空军西部和西南部司令部多个基地的大量战斗机提供支持。他们知道一场攻击迫在眉睫，并已为此做好了准备。

巴基斯坦空军的四个空军司令部——北部、中部、南部和西部——均配备了可部署的指挥与控制（C2）中心，能够指挥远距离的行动。在其众多功能中，有一项给笔者留下了深刻印象——对高超音速导弹的远程引导，例如巴基斯坦空军JF-17C“枭龙”战机发射的CM-400AKG导弹，其目标是印度武器库中一些最强大的资产，包括技术先进的俄制S-400防空系统（详见《S-400困境》）。

笔者获得了罕见的机会进入其中一个可部署的C2中心，亲眼见证了其运作方式。这是巴基斯坦空军参谋长扎希尔·艾哈迈德·巴伯尔·西杜空军元帅自2021年3月就任巴空军司令以来所推行的多域一体化作战理念的一部分——更多相关内容详见后文。一位来自新成立的太空部队的空军少将补充道：“这些C2中心可靠且坚固，能够越过边境侦察印度境内的情况，但由于其敏感性，我不会透露具体范围。通过将数据与我们新的无人、太空、电子战和网络司令部的数据相融合，这些中心已成为我们有效的神经中枢。”

巴基斯坦空军的太空司令部重新定义了战场空间。利用国产卫星，它提供全天候的情报、监视和侦察（ISR）支持。全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）通过数据链将实时信息传输给巴基斯坦空军的飞机，绕过了视距通信的限制。通过安全的卫星通信（SATCOM）连接，飞行员不仅获得了无与伦比的态势感知能力，还具备了电子攻击等进攻能力。这是巴基斯坦空军“Link 17”系统（及增强型“天空卫士”系统）的核心部分，数据被传输给JF-17、歼-10C和“爱立眼”预警机，为飞行员提供赢得战争所需的态势感知。

这意味着每个驾驶舱都能通过加密数据链接收到“可识别空情图”，确保巴基斯坦空军机组人员拥有主宰天空所需的战术清晰度。这种太空、网络、电子战（EW）和动能打击力量的融合，已将巴基斯坦空**变为一支真正的多域作战部队，有能力在未来极有可能发生的战争中进行威慑、响应并取得胜利。自笔者2020年上次访问以来，这种能力已经建立起来，并显然正在彻底改变巴基斯坦空军的训练和作战方式。

笔者采访的几位退役军人(veterans)着重强调，巴基斯坦空军只是由陆军参谋长阿西姆·穆尼尔陆军元帅领导的战争机器的一部分。穆尼尔元帅于8月中旬对美国进行了高调访问。他整合了陆、海、空三军的综合力量，但本文主要关注巴基斯坦空军。

电子战

4月29日，即帕哈尔加姆袭击事件发生一周后，四架印度空军“阵风”战斗机从安巴拉空军基地起飞。它们的任务是轰炸北部的**目标，但据巴基斯坦空军称，部署在前线的一支巴基斯坦空军机动电子战（EW）部队发现了它们的接近，并干扰了其雷达和通信。同时，对北部电网的网络攻击使得“阵风”战机束手无策。它们放弃了任务，转而飞往斯利那加空军基地。

在2019年2月的“迅捷报复”行动中表现出色的第24“致盲者”中队的达索20 ECM电子战机，由于功率不足，未在“坚固结构”行动中使用。试图压制目标接收机在很大程度上受功率输出的影响，功率不足会降低干扰机扰乱目标信号的效果。对于S-400防空系统或“阵风”的泰雷兹RBE2雷达来说，情况本该如此，因为MBDA在设计时就考虑了其抗干扰能力，并与被动的泰雷兹“频谱”电子战系统进行了集成。

近年来，由巴基斯坦空军司令西杜空军元帅推动的新成立的国家航空航天科技园（NASTP）设计的电子战机动部队，被部署在不同地点以干扰目标。从4月29日印度空军尝试失败的攻击到5月6日，巴基斯坦空军观察到印度空军从哈西马拉（东部司令部第101中队的驻地）向瓜廖尔及其他几个基地（西部司令部第17中队“阵风”的驻地安巴拉、斯利那加和拉贾斯坦邦的比卡内尔/纳尔）部署了多达20架“阵风”。数套S-400（SA-21“咆哮者”）地对空导弹连被转移至阿达姆普尔、布季和比卡内尔。

4月底至5月初，印度空军动员了约400架飞机，运输机队执行了超过500架次的飞行任务，显然是为了调动武器、后勤和人员以发动攻击。巴基斯坦空军已做好了准备。

“我们不能让这次攻击不受惩罚。任何人都不能侵犯巴基斯坦的主权领土，我们受命保护它。”

5月7日12时30分，攻击来临，印度空军使用远程“斯派斯2000”（Spice 2000）精确制导炸弹轰炸了巴基斯坦境内的九个地点。空军参谋长立即改变了交战规则，指示空中待命的巴基斯坦空军战斗机从防御模式转为进攻模式。他通过无线电直接向所有在空中的巴基斯坦空军飞行员下达命令，指挥他们击落敌机。据多个消息来源称，他告诉空中的战斗机飞行员：“干掉他们，干掉他们，不让他们进入巴基斯坦一寸领土。”

巴基斯坦空军不能让这次攻击不受惩罚，正如其发言人告诉我的那样：“任何人都不能侵犯巴基斯坦的主权领土——我们受命保护它。”

“当印度空军投下那些炸弹时，空中已经有72架印度空军飞机，他们的数量在稳步增加。我们开始对由‘阵风’、苏-30MKI和幻影2000组成的不同打击编队发起攻击。”

印度空军的36架“阵风”战机中的大多数在某个时间点都在印度边境一侧以进攻模式飞行，据巴基斯坦空军称，它们装备了MBDA公司性能强大的“流星”（Meteor）超视距空空导弹，并由装备以色列“德比”（Derby）超视距导弹和“斯派斯2000”精确制导炸弹（PGM）的苏-30MKI“侧卫”战斗机提供支援。

根据巴基斯坦三军公共关系部（ISPR）在5月7日的新闻发布会，印度空军在东部边境部署了八个编队，每个打击编队由八架飞机组成：四架苏-30MKI、两架“阵风”和两架幻影2000。

锁定目标

一位巴基斯坦空军资深飞行员解释了他们如何为与印度的战争做准备，这始终是一个现实的可能性。

“关键在于训练，”他说。“

进入战区时，战斗机的雷达无法看到所有目标，因为它们太远了，但萨博2000‘爱立眼’预警机可以。”

作为高价值资产，无疑也是印度的目标，萨博2000“爱立眼”将在远离印度400多公里（250英里）的西部边境附近飞行，以避开危险。他继续说道：“坐在‘爱立眼’预警机屏幕前的操作员会将敌机分组，并将其分配给巴基斯坦空军的编队。这将根据方位角和高度以三到四架飞机为一组进行，然后操作员进行评估，并将（位置）信息传递给所有飞机，但他仍然会控制整个战局。”

“作战态势图是通过Link 17/‘天空卫士’系统建立的，我们在驾驶舱的显示器上能看到它，以及我们被指派击落的飞机——我们称之为‘合同’（the contract）。空战总指挥和他的团队（在多域作战室）也会在空军总指挥部的一个巨大屏幕上监视整个战局。”

“战斗机飞行员在驾驶舱里有两部电台，一部用于讨论完整的空中态势，另一部用于与编队内的成员通话。”

“如果我瞄准他们的1号和2号机，我会在我的雷达屏幕上看到它们，把光标放在它们上面，然后用我的导弹锁定它们。”

“我的雷达随后锁定目标，并持续将信息传输给导弹，直到一定距离，导弹自身的主动电子扫描阵列（AESA）导引头在PL-15导弹的‘最小脱离距离’（MAR）内开机。”

最小脱离距离（MAR）是指攻击机可以接近目标并发射导弹，然后在敌方导弹的威胁下能够击落你之前，脱离战斗的最短距离。

“一旦你的导弹（此处指PL-15）进入主动制导距离，你就可以转弯返航（以确保你不会飞入‘流星’导弹的最小脱离距离——比如说35英里）。带有AESA导引头的导弹随后将锁定目标并将其击落。”

笔者被告知，“阵风”战斗机的飞行员直到PL-15E导弹命中前大约三秒钟，可能都不知道是什么东西击中了他们。

“记住，如果你错过了指定的飞机，它可能会反过来攻击你。我们为此不断训练。一次15分钟的任务，通常需要长达八小时的任务后讲评！”

“在战区，你可以尽可能多地部署飞机。印度空军向责任区（AOR）派出了72架飞机，但这对地面引导拦截员（GCI）来说控制起来非常困难！”

印度空军当晚必须吸取的教训之一是，他们在空中部署的飞机数量过多，难以驾驭。每名印度空军的地面引导拦截员都必须在极度动态的情况下管理多架飞机，尤其是在飞机被击落时。巴基斯坦空军司令说：“我们为每一架歼-10或JF-17 Block 3都指定了一架印度空军飞机，由于多域作战的优势，战场空间管理得更好。”

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注册时间： 2023年 9月 10日 15:11

#2 Re: 英国航空月刊报道印巴空战：小巴击落四架阵风，重创四架，将择机公布证据

帖子 由 rtscts楼主 » 2025年 9月 12日 21:53

5月7日凌晨，等待印度空军战斗机行动的是巴基斯坦空军的歼-10C“猛龙”和JF-17C“枭龙”战斗机，两者均装备了中国的PL-15（CH-AA-10“阿巴顿”）超视距空空导弹和射程较短的PL-10（CH-AA-9“阿斯雷尔”）导弹。在它们身后是F-16C Block 52战斗机，装备着射程较短的AN/APG-68雷达和AIM-120C先进中程空对空导弹（AMRAAM）。

双方训练有素的顶尖飞行员都带着巨大的国家荣誉感投入战斗。当他们相互高速接近，印度战斗机的导弹进入“待发”状态时，巴基斯坦空军司令从国家ISR空中作战中心（NAIIOC）下令切断他们的数据链，这意味着他们将失去所有态势感知能力。遍布巴基斯坦东部边缘的机动电子战部队的干扰完成了致命一击。“阵风”顶尖的泰雷兹“频谱”（Spectra）综合电子战系统旨在保护印度空军的战机。该系统本应警告飞行员有东西在监视他们，他们需要开始采取规避动作。“频谱”系统本应探测到敌机雷达的电磁波。除非歼-10没有开启雷达，而是通过数据链将目标信息传输给战斗机，然后发射PL-15。当导弹最终在末端阶段开启其AESA导引头时，对“阵风”来说已经太晚了。

在作战室里，巴基斯坦空军司令指示一名飞行员向综合完整空中态势图（CCAP）屏幕上显示的目标开火。笔者观看了一段录像，显示一枚PL-15E导弹离开歼-10的导弹挂架，飞向红色目标。一旦目标被击中，信号会间歇性闪烁，直到消失。巴基斯坦空军掌握了关于这些目标的所有信息。

正如一位退役军官所说：“他们就像是待宰的羔羊——当我们的歼-10C发射那些PL-15时，他们毫无机会。我们的多域作战确保了印度空军飞行员在空战中无法发挥作用。”

据信，歼-10C的KLJ-10雷达和“阵风”的RBE2雷达的探测距离都在200公里（125英里）左右。据巴基斯坦空军称，没有一枚“流星”导弹向巴基斯坦空军的战斗机发射。PL-15E导弹在160至190公里（100至120英里）的距离上击中了目标（接近PL-15出口版本的最大动力射程），而“流星”的射程仅约150公里，这就解释了原因。PL-15E的射程优势约为40-50公里，印度空军的战斗机在印度领土上空被击落。PL-15的速度肯定比“流星”快，这也是另一个因素。巴基斯坦空军有效地将印度空军飞行员困在了他们的“杀伤链”中。

此时，印度空军的三颗卫星已被巴基斯坦空军使用其自主研发的系统所控制。下行链路随后被切断，GPS信号被中和。与此同时，巴基斯坦空军的网络战部队发动了全面攻势，瘫痪了印度96%的社交网络，渗透了关键系统，甚至扰乱了该国的铁路、航空公司、银行和能源网，以制造混乱。印度各地的闭路电视屏幕上闪现着挑衅的信息，网站被篡改，关键数字节点被攻击，引发了印度广大地区的电力中断。这是世界上任何空军首次将其网络行动与动能行动同步。

巴基斯坦空军的网络作战已转为进攻模式。回顾2019年的“迅捷报复”行动，当时没有网络战的痕迹，但到2021年，创建新司令部的工作已经开始，该司令部于2023年5月成立，并于2024年10月开始运作。巴基斯坦空军建立了一个网络靶场，通过蓝队和红队的对抗来培养网络战技能。在“坚固结构”行动中，巴基斯坦空军网络部队的成员在实现正确效果方面发挥了积极作用，当时网络战与动能作战相结合。巴基斯坦空军通过参与“印度河之盾24”（Indus Shield 24）等行动和演习来保持其相关性。

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#3 Re: 英国航空月刊报道印巴空战：小巴击落四架阵风，重创四架，将择机公布证据

帖子 由 rtscts楼主 » 2025年 9月 12日 21:54

发布消息

5月7日晚些时候，当巴基斯坦三军公共关系部（ISPR）举行新闻发布会时，这场冲突的消息在欧洲传开。

巴基斯坦空军副参谋长（作战）和公共关系总干事让世界大吃一惊，他们声称巴基斯坦空军击落了五架印度空军战斗机。其中包括三架，后增至四架，性能极强的4.5代“阵风”战斗机，这些战斗机装备了顶尖的泰雷兹“频谱”电子战系统。空对空击落的战果得到了社交媒体账户图片的证实，并包括了坠机地点的GPS坐标。

正如巴基斯坦空军副参谋长（作战）在有本地和国际媒体参加的新闻发布会上所披露的那样，印度空军在凌晨时分不断紧急起飞战斗机，以增援并饱和防空系统。“我们的策略是在我们选定的责任区内集中兵力，并利用我们自身的优势作战。一旦他们看到我们的数量，印度空军的战斗机就发射了他们的对地武器，我们识别了它们。此事一发生，参谋长就将交战规则从‘威慑’改为‘确保击杀’。”

“我们瞄准了‘阵风’，因为印度空军一直说它们将‘带来改变’。”

副参谋长（作战）在发布会上借助屏幕讲述了损失情况和被击落的地点。巴基斯坦空军窃听了印度空军“阵风”的通信，并听到了一个四机编队“哥斯拉1-4”（Godzilla 1-4）的恐慌和窘迫，他们发现其中一架法国喷气机失踪了。

他向与会媒体播放了录音，这在当时相当惊人，但似乎“阵风”飞行员错误地在开放频率而不是安全频率上通话。在对峙期间，巴基斯坦空军通过其电子情报系统在72架飞机中识别出14架“阵风”，然后对它们进行了打击。

巴基斯坦空军还打击了位于巴纳拉的北部综合指挥与控制中心（ICCS）的雷达，这有效地切断了印度空军领导层与其战斗机之间的所有通信。

惊艳世界的PL-15导弹

PL-15E出口版曾在2021年和2024年的珠海航展上展出。笔者被告知，巴基斯坦空军版本的射程约为190公里（120英里）。巴基斯坦空军导弹击中目标的最远距离约为190公里（120英里）。根据国际战略研究所（IISS）的说法，PL-15以其远程能力和高能助推-维持发动机而闻名。“助推-维持”部分据信指的是一个两级发动机，既提供初始加速也提供持续飞行能力。这使其能够达到超过5马赫的速度。发射并进入末端阶段后，发动机的第二级脉冲将点燃，提供额外的推力以增加在远距离上的击杀概率。如果导弹以超音速发射，就像歼-10C所做的那样，它可以在大部分飞行过程中保持5马赫以上的速度。在发动机燃尽后，它将不可避免地开始减速。

PL-15/-15E是少数几种由微型有源电子扫描阵列雷达导引头制导的空对空导弹之一，该导引头同时具备主动和被动模式。根据IISS的说法，日本部署了一种装备AESA导引头的超视距导弹（AAM-4B），并有猜测认为美国部署了一种装备AESA导引头的AMRAAM导弹版本，但不对外出口。根据IISS的说法，该导弹具有更强的抗干扰能力和对隐形目标的更好性能。此外，据信其混合制导系统支持由预警机（AEW&C）主导的微型航向修正双向数据链。

据报道，预警机可以通过中国的XS-3战术数据链引导导弹飞向目标，使其能够在防区外发射并被“引导”至各自的目标……以保持不被发现。

因此，PL-15E可以在其大部分飞行过程中不依赖机载AESA雷达，从而显著降低被探测的可能性。第三方目标指示的优势部分在于，发射飞机在交战中可以保持被动。

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#4 Re: 英国航空月刊报道印巴空战：小巴击落四架阵风，重创四架，将择机公布证据

帖子 由 rtscts楼主 » 2025年 9月 12日 21:55

印度军方接连发射了速度可达3000公里/小时（1900英里）的“布拉莫斯”（Brahmos）空对地/地对地导弹。巴基斯坦空军告诉我，有“布拉莫斯”导弹被“软杀伤”和“硬杀伤”。有说法称巴基斯坦空军干扰了“布拉莫斯”的频率，但无人证实。在新闻发布会上，巴基斯坦空军发言人在屏幕上展示了“布拉莫斯”的雷达信号，称其未命中目标并飞入了阿富汗。52分钟后，印度空军的战斗机被巴基斯坦空军智取，仓皇逃回基地。一位高级官员告诉笔者：“‘阵风’本身足够强大，虽然我们最初宣布击落了三架，BS001（第17中队）、BS022、BS027（均为第101中队），但我们在7月中旬通过人力情报（HUMINT）确认，BS021（来自第101中队）也被确认在斯利那加上空被击落。”笔者了解到，另有四架飞机未能返回飞行线。巴基斯坦空军掌握了它们的尾号，因为他们通过电子情报知道哪些飞机受到了严重损坏。他们正努力通过开源情报（OSINT）/人力情报（通常是地面间谍）进行确认。巴基斯坦空军克制了对2000公里（1250英里）以外的目标进行攻击，因为它认为这可能引发全面战争。

上次由 rtscts 在 2025年 9月 12日 21:56 修改。

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#5 Re: 英国航空月刊报道印巴空战：小巴击落四架阵风，重创四架，将择机公布证据

帖子 由 rtscts楼主 » 2025年 9月 12日 21:55

战果确认：全副武装且极其危险的“阵风”

笔者理所当然地想知道巴基斯坦空军如何能识别被击落的飞机，因为许多印度公众不会相信。正如一位退役军官解释的那样：“在这场超视距战争中，很难展示你击落的飞机的残骸，因为它们坠落在印度境内。尽管社交媒体上出现了许多图片，但我们的敌人永远不会承认，所以我们像大多数空军一样，用不同的参数来判断‘击落’。”

“我们的识别矩阵（ID Matrix）是一个结构化流程，确保空战行动的准确性、问责制和验证。它始于探测到飞机雷达，然后在指挥中心的综合完整空中态势图（CCAP）上对其进行肯定性识别，每架印度飞机都在那里被清晰地标记和跟踪。”

“一旦确认探测，下一步是评估导弹系统的锁定参数，导弹只能在特定的速度、距离和角度限制内攻击目标。在锁定目标后，导弹发射，并通过雷达跟踪其进程。如果目标的雷达信号从CCAP屏幕上消失，则被记录为‘可能击落’。”

“然而，过程并未就此结束，返回基地后，飞行员会进行彻底的任务后讲评，审查任务视频录像，以验证导弹交战是否满足所有要求参数——方向、速度、锁定距离和包线。这个多层识别矩阵不仅保证了交战的精确性，也确保了透明度和任务后验证，使其成为巴基斯坦空军确认空对空胜利可信度的基石。在完成这些步骤后，巴基斯坦空军试图通过开源情报/人力情报来确认‘击落’。”

没有多个野战雷达和扇区总部的雷达输入无缝集成，在指挥总部创建CCAP，上述所有步骤都无法完成。巴基斯坦空军的这一流程确保了来自地理上分散的雷达的数据被融合成一个统一的、实时的作战显示。各雷达不再独立工作，其覆盖区域被数字化地重叠和同步，消除了盲区和死角。巴基斯坦空军实现了对国家领空的360度监视，使指挥官能够精确地跟踪、识别和优先处理空中威胁。它通过过滤和关联雷达馈送，减少了目标的重复或误判，从而增强了态势感知能力。正如那位高级官员告诉笔者的：“‘雷达组网’（Radar Knitting）象征着从局部雷达控制向网络中心防御系统的过渡，使巴基斯坦空军能够通过统一的感知、协调的反应和稳健的指挥控制来维持空中优势。”

巴基斯坦空军提供了“阵风”的尾号BS001、BS021、BS022和BS027，以便达索公司有机会澄清这些飞机是否仍在役。大部分印度民众和新闻频道仍然拒绝相信“阵风”被击落，但尽管印度空军否认这些指控，他们尚未提供这四架飞机在5月7日之后的照片，包括序列号和制造商序列号的特写。

达索公司一直保持沉默，尽管它确实非同寻常地发布了一份新闻稿，否认其首席执行官埃里克·特拉皮耶（Eric Trappier）曾说过“没有‘阵风’被击落”，此前这一说法在社交媒体上流传。

消息人士告诉笔者：“我们拥有被击落飞机的视频录像和战损评估图像，我们打算在我们自己选择的、认为适当的时候发布，这将给印度空军带来进一步的尴尬。”

charleswu

此时，印度空军的三颗卫星已被巴基斯坦空军使用其自主研发的系统所控制。下行链路随后被切断，GPS信号被中和。与此同时，巴基斯坦空军的网络战部队发动了全面攻势，瘫痪了印度96%的社交网络，渗透了关键系统，甚至扰乱了该国的铁路、航空公司、银行和能源网，以制造混乱。印度各地的闭路电视屏幕上闪现着挑衅的信息，网站被篡改，关键数字节点被攻击，引发了印度广大地区的电力中断。这是世界上任何空军首次将其网络行动与动能行动同步。

charleswu

https://www.key.aero/article/when-going-gets-tough

charleswu

Indian and Pakistan air forces clash

Mina Adel delves into the previous experiences of both the Pakistan and Indian air forces that may have aided them during their spat in May

Air battles between the Indian and Pakistani air forces have always been described as among the fiercest in history, not only in terms of intensity and the number of aircraft involved but also due to the daring and bravery of pilots on both sides. Due to these clashes, the names of pilots such as Muhammad Mahmood (MM) Alam and Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon became legendary.

On May 7, many of us took a keen interest in one of the most significant and intense air battles in modern history. What made this confrontation particularly noteworthy was that it involved two evenly matched adversaries, each equipped with a mix of Western and Eastern military systems. As usual, the battle sparked widespread debate in the media, leading to the circulation of misinformation that initially obscured the facts.

This prompted Air Forces Monthly, renowned for its commitment to providing unique and impartial coverage for its readers, to engage with an elite group of experts and

charleswu

9th July 2025
Feature
Indian and Pakistan air forces clash

Mina Adel delves into the previous experiences of both the Pakistan and Indian air forces that may have aided them during their spat in May


The Chengdu J-10C was undoubtedly a mystery to the Indian Air Force until the night of May 6/7. They certainly know the PAF’s capabilities now Awais Lali
Air battles between the Indian and Pakistani air forces have always been described as among the fiercest in history, not only in terms of intensity and the number of aircraft involved but also due to the daring and bravery of pilots on both sides. Due to these clashes, the names of pilots such as Muhammad Mahmood (MM) Alam and Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon became legendary.

On May 7, many of us took a keen interest in one of the most significant and intense air battles in modern history. What made this confrontation particularly noteworthy was that it involved two evenly matched adversaries, each equipped with a mix of Western and Eastern military systems. As usual, the battle sparked widespread debate in the media, leading to the circulation of misinformation that initially obscured the facts.

This prompted Air Forces Monthly, renowned for its commitment to providing unique and impartial coverage for its readers, to engage with an elite group of experts and former pilots to analyse the battle and extract valuable lessons for future aerial conflicts. Among them were Osman Basibuyuk, a Turkish F-16C instructor and air combat specialist; Pierre-Henri Chuet, a French Navy Rafale pilot; and Mikael Grev, a Swedish Gripen pilot.

Sweeping Indian storm

On May 6, India issued a notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding a large-scale aerial manoeuvre along the southern part of its border with Pakistan, scheduled to take place between May 7 and May 8, 2025. On the same day, Indian P-8I aircraft were flying over the Arabian Sea. These aircraft possess advanced intelligence-gathering and communication capabilities, allowing them to monitor hostile communications and identify potential threats, particularly air defence systems. In addition to their primary role in maritime surveillance, they also play a crucial role in monitoring Pakistani naval exercises in the region.

At dawn on May 7, the Indian military launched a counterterrorism operation named Operation Sindoor. The term Sindoor is a red cosmetic powder worn by married women. It is a symbol of marital status, and its absence often signifies widowhood, thus symbolising the loss of husbands in the recent terrorist attack. According to India’s official statement, fighter jets took off from multiple air bases to conduct precision strikes on nine sites along the Pakistani border believed to be linked to terrorist groups, without targeting any Pakistani military installations.

The Indian military released footage confirming the successful precision strikes on targets using cruise missiles such as SCALP, AASM guided munitions, Harop kamikaze drones, and even quadcopters. However, local sources reported that the attacks resulted in 26 civilian deaths and 46 injuries, and that Pakistan’s air defences failed to deter or stop the assault.

Then the Indian Air Force expanded its aerial campaign, making Pakistani air bases primary targets. Eleven PAF air bases attacked, with footage confirming strikes on facilities such as Rafiqui, Nur Khan (formerly Chaklala), Rahim Yar, Sukkur (Bholari), Chunian, Mushaf (Sargodha) and Shahbaz (Jacobabad), along with three key air defence radar sites in Basrur, Sukkur and Arif Wala. These specific airbases were selected due to their strategic importance, as they house Pakistan Air Force command and control centres, and their tactical significance, which includes hosting elite squadrons with strike-capable fighter jets. However, despite the strikes, India’s missile attacks lacked the necessary intensity to cripple aerial operations, causing only minor damage to runways and hangars, which were easily repairable during air operations. The primary objective appeared to be the delivery of a strategic political message rather than inflicting catastrophic damage. Chuet examined the photos of the strikes and shared some interesting observations: “The Indians have demonstrated their ability to carry out precise strikes and inflict damage. In the military, we generally favour the concentration of forces, meaning that firepower is typically focused on a specific target. However, in this case, the Indians, likely for political messaging and marketing reasons, opted for a more dispersed approach, striking multiple locations but with relatively limited impact at each site.

“There are two possible explanations: either this was a deliberate decision to avoid escalation, which aligns with their official narrative, or many of their missiles were intercepted. Nevertheless, when we analyse the precision of the strikes and the absence of widespread collateral damage, unlike situations in Ukraine, where strikes often leave noticeable marks on surrounding areas, it becomes evident that the Indians possess the capability to conduct pre-planned, highly accurate attacks in Pakistan. This challenges Pakistani claims regarding their ability to degrade the precision of Indian missiles, especially given the fact that Indian forces successfully struck key structures in a manner consistent with Western military operations. He concluded: “Once again, we should be cautious when hearing assertions that the Indians are incompetent or lack precision. These strikes demonstrate that they can target Pakistani military bases with remarkable accuracy. As a former ground attack pilot, I recognise a well-executed mission when I see one. In this case, the Indians effectively carried out their air-toground targeting operations.”

PAF professionalism in air combat

The Pakistani military announced the launch of Operation Bunyan al-Marsous to counter the Indian forces, which they claimed had struck fictitious terrorist targets, as described by the Pakistani Prime Minister. Pakistan later officially declared that it had shot down five Indian fighter jets in a fierce aerial battle, including three Rafale jets, a Su-30, and a MiG-29, with no official response from the Indian side.

In a press conference, the spokesperson for the Pakistan Air Force provided a detailed explanation of the aerial battle between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, describing it as one of the most intense air battles in modern history. A total of 72 Indian fighter jets engaged with 42 Pakistani fighter jets. The Indian formations concentrated their forces for an attack from four principal axes, prompting the Pakistani side to call in additional fighter jets to reinforce the formations already engaged in the aerial battle. The Pakistani strategy focused on identifying the types of Indian aircraft using their signals, confirming the presence of 14 French-made Rafale jets. Immediately, orders were issued for pilots to prioritise the destruction of the Rafale jets to weaken the Indian formations. The Pakistani formations took two minutes to adjust the rules of engagement and 20 minutes to deploy 42 aircraft into the air. It is estimated that the number of fighter jets has reached 40, comprising three models: the F-16 MLU, JF-17C Block-3 and the J-10CE. These were divided into ten Finger 4 formations, a standard tactic for Pakistani fighter jets based on American combat doctrine.


The PAF claims of downing three Indian Air Force Rafales, has not done the French jet any good. Undoubtedly both Thales who supplied the SPECTRA electronic warfare system and Dassault the aircraft manufacturers will be carrying out their own investigations as to why it happened
Sanjay Simha
“The PL-15 missile’s radar is probably activated 15-30 seconds before impact.”

The Pakistanis had multiple opportunities to study and engage the Rafale aircraft in various training exercises. Their experience began with training alongside naval Rafale jets on the French aircraft carrier in 2012, followed by exercises with Qatari Rafale jets during Anatolian Eagle 2021 in Turkey. Additionally, they participated in Spears of Victory drills in 2024 and 2025, where they trained with both French and Qatari Rafale jets.

Finally, the Pakistanis engaged in combat exercises against Qatari Typhoon jets during Zelzal–2024. While these experiences do not diminish the capabilities of the French Rafale, its opponent has thoroughly developed effective counter-tactics, which have given it an advantage, as the Pakistani Air Force spokesperson emphasised in a statement. On the other hand, the Indian Air Force also participates annually in exercises against similar or more advanced aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force. Notably, in Pitch-Black exercises in Australia, Cope India against the US Air Force, Garuda with the French Air Force, Cobra Warrior with the Royal Air Force, and even Red Flag drills in the United States. However, it has never participated in any exercises against Chinese jets, particularly the J-10C.

Basibuyuk stated: “As someone who has previously participated in exercises with Pakistani pilots and flown with exchange pilots sent to Turkey, I can easily say the training level of Pakistani pilots is high.” He added: “The Pakistan Air Force has been participating in the Anatolian Eagle exercises held in Turkey for many years [since 2004]. These exercises have the same characteristics as the Red Flag exercises conducted in the US.


The Pakistan Air Force regularly send their F-16C/ Ds and JF-17 Thunders to Exercise Anatolian Eagle at Konya, where the aircrews would undoubtedly pick up valuable tactical tips
Alan Warnes

An Indian Air Force Su-30MKI from Bareilly Air Force Station comes into land at Tanagra air base in Greece after an Exercise Iniochos sortie in April. Turkey works with Pakistan, Greece entertains India; all four air forces align with their enemy’s enemy
Alan Warnes
“If the operating frequencies of the threat are not in the library, it is not possible to prevent or deceive such threats.”

“In the Anatolian Eagle training area, air warfare can be exercised in conditions closest to reality. Such exercises, which simulate real warfare, provide pilots with great experience. We know that the Pakistan Air Force has also participated in Red Flag exercises in the US. Therefore, the pilots had practiced air combat similar to the one that took place on May 7 many times in their training, so they did not encounter any surprises. This was their biggest advantage. As for Indian pilots, they don’t have so much experience in international exercises and training.”

Basibuyuk added: “One of the most critical factors that determines the winner of a war is the technology of the weapons used.

Previously, the main striking force of the Pakistan Air Force was the F-16. Pakistan added new F-16 Block 52+ aircraft to its fleet in 2005. However, they are not used in intercept missions. The radars of the F-16s in the PAF are old technology now (AN/APG-68 radar). The emergence of AESA has revolutionised fire control radars.”

After Pakistan received J-10Cs with AESA radars from China, it must have tested them against their F-16s. The J-10Cs would have gained superiority over western-made F-16s and their weapons, so that the PAF began using J-10Cs as interceptor aircraft. This preference indicates the J-10C aircraft possesses significant capabilities.

Indian mistakes or forced to act?

The Indians did not initially target PAF aircraft, defence systems, or radars at the start of the battle, as they believed this might lead to a direct aerial engagement. However, this assumption was wrong, considering the Balakot 2019 conflict, when the PAF responded to Indian attacks not aimed at the Pakistan military.

So I asked experts for their assessment of both sides and to clarify the tactics used in such combat scenarios: Chuet explained: “We have a border, and on the other side of it Pakistani fighters were present. On the Indian side, they probably sent fighters known as ‘sweeps’. The role of sweeps is not to engage in direct combat but rather to ensure that enemy fighters retreat, preventing them from penetrating or interfering with the firing points of the strikers. One key aspect to analyse in the coming weeks is which aircraft were assigned to air-to-air roles, and which were tasked with air-to-ground operations. Did the Indian forces separate these roles, or did they assume that the Rafale, being their best aircraft, would initially perform air-to-ground operations before switching to an air-to-air role? If this transition occurred, it would have burdened the Rafale, making it vulnerable against specialised enemy aircraft designed for air-to-air combat.

He added: “Another surprising aspect is the altitude at which the strikers operated. Typically, we would expect them to arrive at low altitudes, then go up to fire their SCALP missiles or BrahMos missiles before ascending. After firing, they would then descend to avoid enemy counterattacks. Understanding whether the aircraft that were hit were strikers or sweepers is crucial because it offers insight into India’s combat strategy. If strikers were hit, it would suggest a serious tactical planning error, specifically concerning the ‘low high low’ decisions on approaching firing points.


The two-man Su-30MKI Flanker is undoubtedly a formidable enemy, and has many operational strengths like the huge BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Still, the Pakistan Air Force claims to have shot one down in May and back in 2019 during the Balakot operation
Alan Warnes

Many believe that Qatar worked with Pakistan to help unlock the tactical strengths of the Dassault Rafale may have while exercising together
Kevin Wills
“However, currently, there is no definitive proof that strikers were affected. If, on the other hand, sweepers or aircraft assigned to swing roles were hit, it becomes vital to analyse the timing of their downing because their briefing likely focused on launching the attack, returning safely, and concluding operations.

“However, Pakistani forces responded with massive force – reportedly deploying over 42 fighters into the air. At that point, an in-flight decision might have been made to change the mission objective. Combat pilots are aware that altering mission plans mid-flight is risky. If the initial plan was to strike and retreat, but then the general staff suddenly instructed pilots to defend the border against PAF aircraft, this represented a significant shift in strategy. The air combat that ensued was no longer just about protecting strike aircraft but turned into a battle for securing Indian airspace.”

Pakistani effective tactics

What was different from the 2019 battle, was that Pakistan’s response came swiftly within the same fight, without a prolonged delay. This could indicate the Pakistani side was well-prepared, both in terms of intelligence and training, allowing them to execute their mission directly and engage without hesitation. We can assume that the primary focus of the Indian aircraft was on monitoring the F-16s. However, considering the scattered locations where aircraft were shot down according to the PAF claims, it becomes evident that the PAF successfully manoeuvred the J-10s and integrated them into mixed formations.

Basibuyuk explained: “If we put aside the manoeuvrability of the aircraft, we can say that an interceptor aircraft must have three basic advantages to gain an advantage over an enemy aircraft. One: it must see the enemy first; two: it must be able to fire at the enemy first, and thirdly it must have an increased ability to protect itself with an electronic warfare system. Pakistan effectively utilised its data link (Link-17) capability during this conflict, which is crucial for transferring the air picture to interceptors. “Here’s a simple explanation of how air engagement takes place. AWACS (in this case the Erieye system) detects the Rafale aircraft and sends target information to the J-10C via data link. J-10C fires the PL-15 missile according to the information received from AWACS. Still, it does not lock on the target with its radar. Thus, the Rafale aircraft is not aware an enemy aircraft has locked onto it. Data link is maintained between the missile in the air and the firing aircraft, so the current target position is constantly updated to the rocket. The missile continues to approach the target. At this time, the missile’s radar is still inactive.


JF-17C Thunder Block 3s with their Chinese KLJ-7A AESA radar, vast array of missiles including the Chinese PL-15, bombs, and Aselpod target pod with an air-to-air refuelling system, make the jet a very different beast from the Block 1/2s. The JF-17Cs have been exhibited at Dubai 2023, Saudi 2024 and Bahrain 2024 airshows in recent years
Alan Warnes
“Since the J-10C aircraft does not have a radar lock on the Rafale, and the rocket coming does not have a lock on the target, the Rafale is still unaware of the enemy engaging it.”

Basibuyuk added: “The PL-15 missile is an active radar-guided missile. The missile’s radar is probably activated 15 to 30 seconds before impact. Since reaction time is very short, the distance is very close, and the PL-15’s radar is AESA-based, jamming will not be effective at that position. In this case, Rafale can’t survive.

“The attack on the Rafale with this tactic was a complete surprise and achieved a very significant success. Additionally, the self-protection system on the Rafale, known as Spectra, did not function effectively. This could be due to two reasons. Either the system’s capability is not good, or the threat library does not contain information about the J-10C aircraft and the PL-15 missile. If the operating frequencies of the threat are not in the library, it is not possible to prevent or deceive such threats.”

Important lessons

This battle highlighted the importance of electronic support aircraft, particularly early warning aircraft and specialist electronic warfare aircraft, as well as the tactical advantages they can provide to fighter formations.

Grev explained: “In BVR [Beyond Visual Range] combat, much of the battle revolves around situational awareness [SA]. A robust sensor, like the one on the Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C, is a vital asset in BVR combat. It can fly at a safe distance, detect all enemies with its powerful radar, and send this information to fighter aircraft on combat air patrol (CAP) at the front, thus eliminating the need for them to use their radar for SA.

He added: “An AEW&C enhances the ‘observe’ phase in the crucial OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). What further strengthens the ‘Orient’ phase is the availability of decision support.

“By consolidating information in one place, advanced AI systems can process sensor data and present it to the operator in a way that maximises their understanding of the actual threat.

Another lesson learned from this battle is the benefits of long-range missiles, such as the PL-15, and the features that make them a significant threat to NATO aircraft in the future. This is due to the ability of Chinese aircraft to carry a large number of these missiles at a lower manufacturing cost. Basibuyuk stated: “After this conflict, the Chinese released videos of the factory where the PL-15E missiles were produced. The missiles were produced by robotics technology without human intervention. With these images, China gave the world the message that it could produce a large number of missiles in a very short time. Air-toair missiles are costly weapons, and China’s mass production will ensure that the price of these weapons is significantly lower.”

He concluded: “In the past, Western companies and Russian companies were in competition in the market, but I think the Chinese will replace the Russians in the coming years.”

Chuet said: “I was an officer in the tactical unit when I was on Super Étendard, and in 2013, I took the initiative to write a summary on air-to-air missiles. I enjoyed researching all the available information from open sources about the air-to-air missiles in existence. That is how I discovered the PL missile family. It has only been a few years since Western armies finally acknowledged their capabilities. Today, most nations around the world use these well-known Fox 3 missiles, which operate on a fire-andforget principle, and they train almost daily to counter this type of threat.”

He added: “It seems the Chinese have automated their missile manufacturing, which would allow them, in the event of combat, to supply their numerous aircraft with missiles rapidly. This process can be highly efficient – if a fighter jet is equipped with six or eight airto-air missiles, compared to the two Meteor missiles on the Rafale, the ability to replenish them quickly becomes crucial.

“However, for this strategy to be effective, the defence industry must be capable of sustaining high production rates.

He concluded: “I am eager to see whether Pakistan will announce orders for stealth aircraft in the coming months or years. Additionally, it will be interesting to observe whether China secures international orders for the J-10C compared to the successful Rafale.